Sartre by MacIntyre, Alasdair
  Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy.
http://www.jstor.org
Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Review 
Author(s): Alasdair Macintyre 
Review by: Alasdair Macintyre 
Source:   The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80, No. 12 (Dec., 1983), pp. 813-817
Published by:  Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026205
Accessed: 23-03-2015 02:52 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at 
 http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Mon, 23 Mar 2015 02:52:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BOOK REVIEWS 813 
tions are sufficient to produce the so-called "subjective" colors in 
certain of the stationary patterns (ibid.). 
If physical colors are to be understood as the concurrent external 
physical causes of color perceptions, they will have to form an un- 
reasonably broad and heterogeneous class, or else there will be a list 
of excluded cases which may prove quite vexing to specify satisfac- 
torily. Once again, the price of maintaining gur truistic connection 
between physical colors and perceived colors seems to be too high. 
Although I have chosen color as an illustration, my argument is 
more generally directed against the supposition that truisms of the 
form 'X things appear X to normal observers in standard condi- 
tions' can be pressed into service when precise specifications are in 
question. It seems to me that 'X' could represent any perceptible 
quality, e.g., cold, circular, or loud. The human perceptual system 
was, after all, never engineered to be a scientific instrument, and so 
it should not be expected to mirror the natural kinds of physics. 
Phenomenal qualities typically have a one-many relationship to 
physical magnitudes and are notoriously evocable in the absence of 
their usual causes. There is a precise but complicated story to be 
told about the relationships between our perceptual systems and 
their physical environment. Truisms may help us to begin it, but 
we should not expect to find them at its conclusion. 
CLYDE L. HARDIN 
Syracuse University 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Sartre. PETER CAWS. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). xiii, 
210 p. $22.50. 
Peter Caws has written a useful book whose limitations, and they 
are severe, are the obverse of its virtues. Faithful to the title of the 
series in which it appears, he has restricted himself first to identify- 
ing, analyzing and evaluating the particular arguments that appear 
in Sartre's texts and secondly to tracing the development of particu- 
lar lines of thought from one argument to another. This latter task 
enables him to characterize both large continuities and striking 
discontinuities in Sartre's preoccupations. Nonetheless this book is 
a chronicle rather than a history. Caws's attitude to Sartre is thor- 
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oughly sympathetic. He always tries to give the most charitable in- 
terpretation of Sartre's assertions and inferences. But, given the 
analytic mode of his appraisal, any conception of what it might be 
to evaluate Sartre's philosophy as a whole has to be absent from 
this book. Sartre's philosophy just is, on the view taken here, the 
sum total of his particular arguments. 
A second omission derives from the almost exclusive focus upon 
Sartre's own writings. When Sartre debates with others, what Caws 
presents is a debate with the-other-as-seen-by-Sartre. The Lukacs 
who appears here is not Lukacs, but Sartre's Lukacs, the Freud is 
Sartre's Freud, the Hegel Sartre's Hegel. Indeed the appearances of 
these characters, who come on stage generally only to be reproved 
by Sartre for their shortcomings, is usually so brief that it could 
scarcely be otherwise. 
A third and related limitation is the almost complete abstraction 
of Sartre's arguments from their context in modern French 
thought. Brunschvicg and Merleau-Ponty receive only brief men- 
tion, Camus none at all. Francis Jeanson's Sartre dans sa vie is 
cited, but not his Le Probleme Moral et la pense'e de Sartre. That 
Sartre was French would appear from this book to have been one of 
the less important facts about him. 
What this asceticism-and it is clear from the little that Caws 
does say in these areas of omission that he could have written excel- 
lently on these omitted topics, had he chosen to do so-wins for 
Caws is the opportunity to dwell in a patient, detailed, narrowly 
focused way on the actual text of Sartre's key arguments, book by 
book, chapter by chapter, paragraph by paragraph, line by line. 
Every work by Sartre from "The Legend of Truth" published by 
Paul Nizan in the journal Bifur in 1931 up to the third volume of 
L'Idiot de la Famille: Gustave Flaubert de 1821 a 1857 which ap- 
peared in 1972 receives its due share of attention. Sartre's fiction 
and his political writings are freely drawn upon when they can be 
used to illuminate the structure of arguments in his more strictly 
philosophical works. So are Simone de Beauvoir's writings. The 
result is invariably a valuable commentary upon the text, one 
which is strictly ancillary to a reading of the text. Thus this book is 
not an introduction to Sartre and it is in no way a substitute for 
reading Sartre. Although Caws has a splendidly plain style which 
makes his own thoughts and Sartre's as available as they can be, a 
good deal here will not be fully intelligible apart from a close read- 
ing of Sartre himself. 
A fine example of Caws's exegesis at its best is his statement at 
the end of Chapter VI, "Bad Faith and the Existence of the For-It- 
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self," of the problem of how Sartre in Being and Nothingness is in 
danger of being unable to avoid idealist conclusions ("it is through 
human reality that there is a world," BN 307), followed by his teas- 
ing out of the various strands of argument in Sartre's strenuous 
avoidance of such conclusions in Chapter VII on "The Existence of 
Others-Sartre's Prise de Conscience". Caws's exegetical achieve- 
ment in such passages is so impressive that his insistentlimitation 
of his task to exegeis and to a level of criticism that remains as 
close to exegesis as possible becomes disappointing. There are two 
points in the book at which this kind of disappointment in the 
reader becomes particularly intense. 
The first concerns the relationship of the self to consciousness, as 
Sartre discussed it in The Transcendence of the Ego which was 
originally published in 1936. Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations 
had argued in favor of a transcendental Ego, presupposed by the 
individuation and unity of consciousness. Against this Sartre con- 
tended that consciousness as such requires no Ego, and he offered a
phenomenological account of what the experience of reading a 
book is, as he recalls it to memory: "while I was reading, there was 
consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel, but the I was 
not inhabiting this consciousness. It was only consciousness of the 
object and non-positional consciousness of itself . . . there was no I 
in the unreflected consciousness" (TE 46-7, quoted by Caws 54). 
This conclusion echoes Hume, but Sartre's primary concern was 
not with personal identity. What he wanted to show was that the 
notion of consciousness is prior to and independent of any notion 
of self: "transcendental consciousness"- that of consciousness 
which the phenomenological reduction makes available to us- "is 
an impersonal spontaneity" (TE 98, quoted 59). Caws defends 
Husserl against Sartre; or rather he defends the view that we cannot 
envisage consciousness without an Ego. "According to Sartre's 
view, there could, strictly speaking, not be said to be any philoso- 
pher left to philosophize after the epoche-nobody to carry on the 
inquiry. And yet the inquiry proceeds, not in the confused and be- 
wildered way that ought presumably to be characteristic of a new- 
born consciousness without presuppositions, but making full use 
of the arsenal of logic and language. It is disingenuous, then, to 
pretend as Sartre does that the cogito can mean only that there is 
consciousness, not that I have it ... and it may be Husserl's good 
sense . . . to insist on the integrity of the transcendental Ego" (56). 
So Caws and Husserl range themselves against Sartre and seem 
to score a very palpable hit. But do they? It seems to be an unques- 
tioned assumption of Caws's argument that either Husserl is in the 
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right or Sartre, an assumption of course that Sartre shared. But 
perhaps in a sense both are right; perhaps what systematic phe- 
nomenological analysis reveals is that the concept of consciousness 
suffers from internal self-contradiction-that we can show with 
equal rigor that it must and that it cannot involve reference to a 
transcendental Ego. This is a possibility that Caws never considers. 
He sees not "a genuine problem," but "a weakness of the pure 
phenomenological method." And I suspect that this may be be- 
cause he takes his duty as a commentator so seriously, refusing to 
criticize Sartre except as it were from close quarters. Yet if I am 
right, the Sartre of the earlier writings on the philosophy of psy- 
chology is perhaps an even more interesting philosopher than 
Caws suggests. For he may have moved almost, if not quite, to the 
point of discovering defects in the everyday-and the phenomeno- 
logical-concept of consciousness akin to those which he explicitly 
discovered in the Freudian concept of the unconscious. 
A second case where Caws's restriction on the range of discussion 
that he allows himself abbreviates his investigation unfortunately 
is in the discussion of the relationship of the self to others. Caws 
summarizes the outcome of Sartre's investigation into this relation- 
ship in Being and Nothingness accurately and lucidly: "we are left 
with conflict, with the permanent elusiveness of the other, with the 
small comfort of objective association under the eye of the Third, 
accompanied by the realization that this association is illusory on 
the subjective level, that each of us is living a private life in paral- 
lel with the others but without genuine community" (111). What 
this means concretely was pictured with great imaginative power 
by Simone de Beauvoir in her novel, L'Invitee. 
In the Critique of Dialectical Reason, however, genuine forms of 
group life and projects of community emerge, and these of a kind 
whose impossibility seemed to have been demonstrated by the ar- 
guments of Being and Nothingness. It must therefore be the case 
that, if the arguments of the Critique are to have any chance of 
succeeding, we can be given good reasons for rejecting at least some 
of the premises from which Sartre argued in Being and Nothing- 
ness. But in his step-by-step discussion of the arguments of the Cri- 
tique Caws never returns to the task of reexamining those premises. 
The failure to do so is all the more important because of its crucial 
relevance to any evaluation of Sartre's claims about the relation- 
ship of his philosophy to Marxism. For the conclusions of the Cri- 
tique are clearly compatible with at least some of Marx's historical 
and sociological theses, while the conclusions of Being and Noth- 
ingness equally clearly, if true, entail the falsity of claims central to 
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Marxism. Thus the history of Sartre's changing relationship to 
Marxism can scarcely be intelligibly related in the absence of some 
hypothesis about which parts of Being and Nothingness Sartre 
must have come to reject as early as the nineteen fifties. Perhaps in 
fact the key transition was the one that Lukacs noted, from the 
Heideggerian themes of Being and Nothingness to the Kantian 
ethics of Existentialism Is a Humanism; but Sartre himself denied 
that he had by this stage changed his positions at all. Caws's failure 
to throw further light on this question seems once again to spring 
from his insistence on restricting his focus. 
Yet the merits of Caws's procedure are very great and they make 
his book an indispensable work of reference. It does not replace, 
but supplements such books as Klaus Hartmann's, Marjorie 
Grene's, and Arthur Danto's. It deserves to be widely read. 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 
Vanderbilt University 
Nature and Natural Science: The Philosophy of Frederick J. E. 
Wood bridge. WILLIAM FRANK JONES. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus 
Books, 1983. 197 p. $19.95. 
It is good to have a new book on the philosophy of F. J. E. Wood- 
bridge, founding co-editor of this JOURNAL and a major influence 
on philosophic naturalism in this country. Woodbridge's thought 
has had a continuing interest in the four decades since his death, as 
evidenced in part by a number of doctoral theses and by Hae Soo 
Pyun's Nature, Intelligibility and Metaphysics: Studies in the Phil- 
osophy of F. J. E. Woodbridge,' a revision of Pyun's 1966 Colum- 
bia University Ph.D. dissertation. One can join Herbert W. 
Schneider in welcoming this new book, of which he writes, in his 
Foreword to the volume, "Professor Jones' book is an excellent ex- 
position of Woodbridge's philosophy, as well as an accurate por- 
trait of the mind and the man." 
Woodbridge's importance lies not only in his own thought but 
in the tradition of realism in American naturalism which he fur- 
thered. Jones quotes Sterling P. Lamprecht's statement in Nature 
and History2: "The Woodbridge tradition does not consist in the 
continued repetition of an orthodoxy of profession and belief. The 
Woodbridge tradition is rather ... a realism which finds in na- 
'Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner, 1972. 
2 York: Anchor Books, 1966. 
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